01244nas a2200193   4500000000100000000000100001008004100002260001200043653003900055653010100094653006700195100001600262245006300278856006000341300001000401490000600411520061900417022001401036       2017                            d  c2017/0410aAsymmetric and Private Information10aMechanism Design, National Government Expenditures and Health, Health: General, Higher Education10aResearch Institutions, Technological Change: Government Policy1 aDanielle Li00aExpertise versus Bias in Evaluation: Evidence from the NIH  uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20150421  a60-920 v93 aEvaluators with expertise in a particular field may have an informational advantage in separating good projects from bad. At the same time, they may also have personal preferences that impact their objectivity. This paper examines these issues in the context of peer review at the US National Institutes of Health. I show that evaluators are both better informed and more biased about the quality of projects in their own area. On net, the benefits of expertise weakly dominate the costs of bias. As such, policies designed to limit bias by seeking impartial evaluators may reduce the quality of funding decisions.  a1945-7782